Information as Substance

OK my dearies, grab something to pensively smoke because it is Philosophy Phriday!!!

Alright everyone, I’m cooking up a few really good essays but they need some more time. To whet your philosophical ramblings palette, here is something I wrote in 2020 comparing Spinoza’s version of God to Berkeley’s version of God to what we now call “information.” I promise this is the last time I will shell off an old essay I wrote in University upon you (I can’t promise that actually) but if you’re upset about that or anything written, please feel free to direct your hatemail to the comment section.

At the heart of metaphysics is the question regarding that which brings about Being.

Physicists try as they do to answer this using the Standard Model of particle physics, bringing us ever closer to the smallest indivisible units and fields which are the foundation for all that we see in the Universe. Beginning with atomic theory we go further down into electrons and neutrons, and further even into quarks, gluons, and the like. No matter how far we dig, however, the question can always be asked: But what is that made of? In the last half-century, this has led physicists to spring towards unification theories, such as String Theory and Quantum Loop Gravity, but the answer to this question continues to feel as distant from us as it did since it was first pondered, likely in the minds of the first humans. In the 17^th century, Europe began to see this problem approached not by physicists, but by philosophers following on the heels of the great minds of Descartes, Leibniz, and Galileo. Of course, there is a long history of East and Southeast Asian ontological philosophy that preceded this—and actually, began grasping at questions and frameworks that Europe hadn’t even considered until the mid-20th century—but Europe did as Europe does and completely ignored those silly barbarians. Nevertheless, Dutch philosopher Baruch Spinoza and English philosopher George Berkeley both came, independently or otherwise, to a similar conclusion on the nature of Being.

Coming from rationalist and empiricist schools, respectively, Spinoza came to approach the problem through reasoning alone, while Berkeley focused on what could be understood from the senses. Nevertheless, both understood that the answer to this question was rooted in the nature of “Substance.” For Spinoza, this was the groundwork for everything, as his Ethics begins with a definition of substance. For Berkeley, Substance came about as a necessary condition to create a non-materialist metaphysics, as he deemed materialist thought to be epistemically invalid.

Despite essentialist traps which it may fall into, Spinoza presents a far stronger and more compelling argument for the nature of Substance as God than does Berkeley, as Berkeley forms an inductive argument that presupposes the existence of God and for this reason, notions of causation and power lie at the core of his argument without justification.

Spinoza begins Ethics with six definitions of which the first is, “By that which is self-caused I mean that whose essence involves existence; or that whose nature can only be conceived of as existing.” He goes on to list the seven axioms from which he builds his argument regarding substance, the first of those being, “All things that are, are either in themselves or in something else.” Granted, the translated language here makes Spinoza sound willfully obtuse, but these two in conjunction form what he goes forth to call, “Substance.” To Spinoza, Substance is that which is in itself, conceived through itself, and whose essence involves existence. It is important here to consider Spinoza’s delineation between “essence” and “existence.” Perhaps the most illuminating description comes from Spinoza himself in his Cogitata Metaphysica, in which he explicates,

“If any philosopher still doubts whether essence is distinct from existence in created things, there is no need for him to toil away at definitions of essence and existence to remove that doubt. For if he merely approaches a sculptor or a woodcarver, they will show him how they conceive in fixed order a non-existence statue, and afterwards bring it into existence.”

Paradigmatically, existence is understood to answer the question: “An sit?” i.e., does it exist? While essence answers the question: “Quid sit?” i.e., what is it? To suggest that something’s essence involves existence, therefore, is to suggest that we are not able to understand its essence without the existence of that thing in the way that one may conceive of a statue yet to be sculpted. Meanwhile, to posit that Substance is in itself and conceived through itself is to say that existence and essence of Substance are not dealt to it by anything besides itself. It both creates and defines itself.

Understanding Substance, we can go forth to analyze Spinoza’s primary argument regarding its nature – namely, “God, or substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence, necessary exists.” Moreover, Spinoza’s argument extends as he proposes that, “There can be, or be conceived, no other substance but God.” These arguments, taken separately or as their sum, are proven and conceived solely through Spinoza’s seven axioms. While there are a number of intermediary steps and proofs which Spinoza performs, I will attempt to condense these without loss of generality and present the following axioms (denoted as Ax.) and propositions (proven through the axioms and denoted as Pr.) as the premises to Spinoza’s argument from which he arrives at the aforementioned conclusions.

Spinoza’s argument for the first part of this conclusion is a proof by contradiction, as he implores the reader to conceive of God’s essence without God’s existence. The assumption, ‘God (or infinite substance) can be conceived without it existing,’ thereby acts as the contrapositive in this proof. A second assumption comes latently as, “some substance exists.” Our first premise comes from Pr. 5 which states, “In the universe there can not be two or more substances with the same nature [read: essence] or attributes.” This is proven through Pr. 1 and Pr. 4 but for now we will consider it sufficient to state that this is a result of the definition of Substance being in itself, and conceived through itself. The second premise is then given as “Existence belongs to the nature of substance” (Pr. 7) whose sub-proof lies in the definition of Substance and Pr.6 which states,

“One substance cannot be produced by another substance” (we shall not go any further into this, but this is proven by Pr. 5 and Pr. 2). The third premise comes from Pr. 8 which states, “Every substance is necessarily infinite.” To understand what this means, one might imagine a box. No matter what, we are always able to imagine a larger box which is able to encapsulate the original box, thus by Spinoza’s definition, it is finite. An infinite thing, in this case substance, has no such bounds which allow it to be contained. The sub-proof for Pr. 8 comes from Pr.5 and Pr. 7. Our fourth and final premise is thereby the axiom that was explicated above positing that if a thing can be conceived of without its existence, then existence is not part of its essence (Ax. 7). Thus, we arrive at a contradiction which renders Spinoza’s first conclusion – that God, or some infinite Substance must necessarily exist, as we have defined that it is indeed a substance and Pr. 8 shows that a Substance must be infinite and Pr. 7 forms a contradiction with Ax. 7. Following this result, which is considered as Pr. 11, we see also that the latter conclusion must follow when considering Pr. 5 and Pr. 6. As, if no two Substances can have the same nature and one Substance is infinite, then there can only be one Substance. If there were another, it would create a bound on the first and thus the first would not be infinite, creating another contradiction. Given the circuitousness of this proof, Spinoza offers two other proofs – one which states quite simply that there must exist some cause for the existence or non-existence of anything and because there is no cause for the non-existence of God, we must assume God to exist; the other follows an a posteriori necessity using a framework of power from existence. Neither of these, however, feel as self-sufficient as his more rigorous proofs.

Berkeley too posits that there is only a singular Substance – God. However, Berkeley’s line of argument focuses more so on an anti-materialist stance regarding Matter. While it is not particularly accurate to ascribe to Berkeley that he does not believe that Matter – or what he calls “Corporeal Substance,” - exists, it does not require us read very far in between the lines.

Nevertheless, to remain more true to the text, Berkeley argues that there is no epistemically valid way to confirm the existence of Matter, as the argument that Matter is created as an act of mind is empirically equivalent. This “act of mind” lies central to Berkeley’s argument as he discriminates between Ideas which are described as “Pictures or Representations,” within the mind and Matter. His conclusion, also in two parts, follows that, to exist, there necessarily exists some “Spirit” with the power of perception and, “who works in all, and by whom all things consist,” (italicized as per the original text).

While, much like Spinoza, Berkeley eliminates possibilities via reductio ad absurdum, the argument as a whole has an inductive character. I will go forth to list a summary of his premises, labelling each premise and reduction with a numeral for reference later on. His first premise is that qualities – such as color, figure, motion, etc. – require perception to exist (i). Anything which requires perception to exist will be labeled as an Idea (ii). Extension, motion, number and those things which one may ascribe to Matter are impossible to imagine in and of themselves as one must imagine qualities such as color and form must also be present (iii). In this way, there is no way to distinguish between these things and qualities previously listed (iv) and thus, they too must be Ideas (v). Ideas have no power, as they are not able to produce or alter (vi). This ability to produce and alter shall be termed “Will” (vii). However, there must exist a cause for the changing of Ideas through time, an example of which is the Principle of Motion (viii). There must exist, therefore, some perceiver with the Will to do so (ix). This cannot be done by humans, as our Will is not strong enough to bring rise to the Principle of Motion (x). Therefore, “an incorporeal active Substance or Spirit,” must exist to bring rise to those changes in Idea that humans cannot through its Will (xi). Spirit, Berkeley defines, is “one simple, undivided, active Being.” Through and in this incorporeal Spirit, changes of Ideas can occur and all Things (Things being defined as a sensible collection of qualities) can exist as Ideas for this Spirit (xii). Thus, it is evident that God must be this Spirit (xiii).

Semantics aside, the similarity between the two arguments is striking. In both cases, the case for the necessary existence of infinite, incorporeal Substance is made. In both cases, this infinite, incorporeal Substance is God. In both cases – while it was not as thoroughly discussed in my summary of Spinoza’s argument – the authors make pleas to essential nature, cause, and power to justify the existence of God as this infinite, incorporeal Substance. Nevertheless, Spinoza’s argument is far more effective than Berkeley’s. While these similarities do indeed exist, it is ultimately the form of Spinoza’s argument which gives him the upper hand. By form, I refer not only to its deductive nature, but also the literal shape of the text on the page as it is presented much like a geometrical proof. While it can be argued that both philosophers pre- suppose the existence of God, as is evidenced by the teleological nature of both arguments, Spinoza’s requires one only to believe that the premises are true to believe the argument true, as it is presented in a testably valid form. For Berkeley, however, the inductive nature of the argument leaves room for unjustified leaps to be made; and indeed, they are made.

The two largest gaps in Berkeley’s argument are his use of epistemic uncertainty as absolute ontological reduction and his metaphysical taxonomy requiring a very literal Deus ex Machina to work as he intends it to. This first error forms the very center of Berkeley’s argument, as his anti-materialist stance which gives rise to the necessity of Substance endowed with the powers of perception, and therefore Will. While one may – and as Berkeley very well argues, one ought to – concede that it is never possible for us to know that ontic Things exist and that we are not living in a world comprised entirely of phenomena, this does not imply that ontic things necessarily do not exist. The argument can indeed be made that ontological status is dependent on epistemic certainty, but Berkeley never makes this argument. This renders reduction v invalid, as it is not true that qualities like extension must be Ideas because they are inseparable from qualities like color. Furthermore, does little to fully distinguish what alternatives exist to Ideas. In particular, he leaves no room for Dasein (borrowing Heidegger’s language) until he claims that we are all part of the Substance that is Spirit or God. In his framework, we have no proper notion of what category thinking beings without the power or Will necessary to bring about motion. Moreover, he makes no attempts to argue or explain why the Will of human is not strong enough to bring this about, it is simply an implicit assumption. Gaps in the argument such as these leave Berkeley’s argument in a compromised position whose source can be considered when comparing his work to the continentals who also often toed the line against materialism. Looking at the works of Heidegger in particular, we see that he makes no concessions or claims regarding the ontic world – or, “objective reality.” For Berkeley, however, some sense of shared reality or “objective” world exists pre-theoretically within which the Principles of Motion occur. This, being a belief directly contradictory to his anti-material stance, suggests that there may also exist for him a presupposed belief in the existence of God – one which becomes explicitly clear as his claims become nearly evangelical in Chapters 141-151. Though it is indeed possible, and likely, that Spinoza pre-supposed the existence of God in his argument, the form of argument and the delineation between “formal” and “objective” prevents his argument from being vulnerable to any invalid leaps in logic.

These philosophers’ writings, now approximately 300 years old, still remain as pertinent as they were then. Physicists and philosophers alike are still continuing to try and understand the nature of Substance. In modern physics, we have a notion of two fundamental types of particles from which an analogy to Substance can be drawn: Bosons and Fermions. In relation to Berkeley’s argument, one might consider Bosons to be that Substance with the Will to bring rise to the Principle of Motion, as Bosons are those particles that carry “Force,” in the language of Newtonian Physics. Fermions, on the other hand, are those particles of which material Things are comprised. Perhaps the greatest question in physics, however, is how we are to unite these particles with what we know of Gravity. Gravity, as we know from Einstein, is simply a curvature of spacetime and requires no particles. In recent years, a potential solution to this schism has come in the form of Information. In Information, we have a ready analogy to be made with Spinoza’s conception of Substance. Because Spinoza makes no claims that Substance as “God-or-Nature” must be a perceptive thing, we are able to consider Information as a possible candidate for this very Substance. Information, in physics, is a non-corporeal entity that exists in everything we see (and don’t see). Perhaps the most ready example is a coin flip: a coin in the air is said to be maximally entropic as we have no information available to the observer as to whether the coin will be heads or tails, but from Lagrangian Mechanics, we know that the coin knows already which state it will land in and it has known since as soon as the coin came off of the hand which tossed it. The information, thereby, exists already within it but is waiting to be extracted by us when the coin does finally land. In this way, one might make the case that the information, embedded in the turning coin, is part of its essence. Furthermore, this information is in itself and conceived through itself, as it is not created by the coin or the hand. Rather, it is the information that determines the state of the coin. This is rooted too in the second law of thermodynamics, as entropy in a closed system is necessarily constant – meaning that information cannot be created nor destroyed. It should be noted that information and entropy are effectively interchangeable as they are two sides of the same coin (pun intended), and for this reason I will go forth in calling it Entropy-Information. We see further evidence of Entropy-Information as Spinoza’s Substance in that it fits all of his axioms and propositions: by nature, it is infinite and incorporeal in that information exists not in physical space, it comes prior to what it “causes” (its affections), it has no counterpart and thus there is no second Substance as such, and existence is indeed a part of its essence, as the nature of Entropy-Information can not be conceived of as not existing because anything which occurs in the universe or in the mind contains Entropy-Information. Considering this, two conclusions seem fair to make. The first is that this evidence strengthens Spinoza’s argument further in that the formulation of models using Entropy-Information are assumed to be completely independent from Spinoza’s argument regarding Substance, and yet the two frameworks overlap with near perfection. Secondly, philosophers of physics ought to consider Spinoza’s argument regarding Substance as God-or- Nature in considerations regarding the nature of Entropy-Information. Moreover, it proves to us, in a sense, the worth and value that the writings of these thinkers – even 300+ years ago – hold. To paraphrase Newton, we have a wealth of knowledge from these brilliant minds, and it is our duty to stand on the shoulders of these giants. Neither physics nor philosophy alone has the capacity to answer such innate and fundamental questions as the nature of existence and what brings it about. Perhaps, however, through a synthesis of the two, we may one day find these answers.